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I. Introduction
Last February marked the thirtieth anniversary of United States v.
Matlock,' a Supreme Court case that many lower courts have cited to determine
whether a party can legitimately refuse to be searched after a third party has
already consented to the search.2 Over the past three decades since Matlock,
lower courts have disagreed about whether one co-occupant's refusal to consent
to a search may trump another co-occupant's consent to search.3
Recently, this issue came to a head in two state court cases: An Indiana
appellate court upheld a search of a defendant's premises in which officers
requested permission to search from the defendant's roommate, even though
the defendant was present at the time of the search.4 Only a few months later,
the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed an appellate court decision that one co-
occupant's refusal trumps another co-occupant's consent.5 Why the difference
in outcome? Lower courts differ in their interpretation of Matlock and employ
two different models of consent searches. 6
Consider this hypothetical: police officers stop Luke for speeding. At the
traffic stop, the officers discover cocaine in the car. When they question Luke
about the cocaine he claims that it belongs to his roommate, Dave, and gives
the officers permission to search the apartment that Luke and Dave share. The
1. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
2. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Matlock case and its ramifications for third party
consent cases where the primary party refuses to allow the search).
3. See infra Part V.A (considering the current circuit split on this issue).
4. See Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (deciding that the
search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances). See also discussion infra Part
V.A. 1 (examining Primus in more detail).
5. See State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1840
(2005) ("[T]he consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one occupant is
not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant.... "); see also discussion infra Part
V.A.2 (examining the Georgia appellate court's decision in Randolph).
6. See infra Part V.B (explaining the two factors that have led the lower courts to reach
opposite conclusions).
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police officers go to the apartment and find Dave, but do not ask him for his
permission to search. Instead, relying on Luke's permission, the officers search
the apartment and find more cocaine, as Luke claimed. Is this search, where
Dave was present but the officers failed to ask him for permission to search,
valid?7 What if the officers arrested Dave and removed him from the scene
before the police officers searched the apartment? What if Dave voiced his
objection to the search?9 Are any-or all-of these searches valid under the
Fourth Amendment? 10
The Supreme Court has recognized that one co-occupant can grant police
officers access to an area shared in common with other occupants.' 1 If the
police wish to search an apartment shared by two roommates, for example, the
officers can validly search if either roommate consents to the search.
12
Occasionally, however, a situation arises in which one roommate consents to
the search, but the other refuses to allow the search. 13 May the police go ahead
with the search when they have valid third party consent, or must they defer to
the wishes of the primary party? This question has important ramifications for
police officers, officers of the court, and the citizenry alike.
Simply stated, can one co-occupant give valid consent for police to search
common areas of a premises when another co-occupant who is present objects
to the search? The Supreme Court has not yet directly ruled on this question. 1
4
7. These facts are similar to the facts in Primus, in which the court decided that the
search based on the third party's consent was valid because "one's authority to give consent is
not dependent upon one's location." Primus, 813 N.E.2d at 376.
8. This variation in the hypothetical mimics the facts of United States v. Matlock, in
which the Supreme Court validated a third party consent search authorized by the defendant's
roommate. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 179 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the police removed the defendant from the scene before asking the third party
for permission to search).
9. This was the defendant's situation in Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834,836 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003), affd, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1840 (2005).
10. For an answer to that question, see discussion infra Part VI.A (summarizing the
current state of Fourth Amendment law on third party consent searches).
11. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169-70 (affirming the principle that one co-occupant may
permit the police to search a shared area).
12. Id.
13. For convenience's sake, the person whose goods the police wish to search and seize
will be referred to as the "primary party," and the co-occupant who consents to the search will
be referred to as the "third party." In the hypothetical above, Luke is the third party and Dave is
the primary party.
14. Almost every court that has addressed this issue has cited Matlock for the famous
statement that "the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is
valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared." United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). Lower courts usually consider whether the
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Other courts in the United States, however, have considered this issue in many
cases, using Matlock as the only nominally controlling authority. 15 Lower
courts have split on the issue-some allow a primary party's refusal to trump a
third party's consent, others allow a third party's consent to trump a primary
party's refusal-thereby creating different rules in different jurisdictions.
16
This disparity among the courts is a problem because searches and seizures are
governed by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, making third party
consent searches a constitutional issue instead of a state law issue. 17 Because
the Fourth Amendment dictates search and seizure issues, it has controlling
authority over every court in the country, both state and federal.' 8 This circuit
split must be resolved.
Part II of this Note begins with an overview of search and seizure
jurisprudence, and then examines the constitutional legitimacy and scope of
consent searches under the Fourth Amendment. Following this background,
Part Ill turns to third party consent searches, focusing on Matlock, then
considers the disparate rationales behind third party consent searches. Before
turning to the split among the lower courts, Part IV considers two models for
third party consent searches. Part V observes the present split among the lower
courts: what the courts are deciding, what rationales they are employing, and
the relevance of the primary party being absent at the time of the third party
consent search. Part VI begins with a synopsis of the current state of the law,
and explains that under the current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the third
party consent must triumph. The Note concludes with a proposal for a new test
for third party consent searches-the "reasonable attempt" test-and offers
arguments in support of the test. The reasonable attempt test requires police
officers to take reasonable steps to obtain consent from the party at whom the
search is directed, whether that party is present at the scene or not. 19 If the
police do not take reasonable steps to obtain the primary party's consent, or the
primary party's absence was determinative in Matlock, and thus whether the primary party's
refusal may override the third party's consent. See infra Part V.A (considering some lower
court decisions on this issue).
15. See infra Part V.A (considering the lower court decisions on the third-party-consent-
versus-primary-party-refusal issue).
16. See infra Part V.A (examining the circuit split on this issue).
17. See infra Part H.C (presenting the constitutional background for third party consent
searches).
18. The Constitution and its Amendments trump state law according to the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
19. If the officers wish to search a shared apartment for goods when they suspect more
than one individual, the officers would have to attempt to obtain the consent of all the
individuals directly implicated in the search.
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primary party refuses to consent, the officers would be required to obtain a
warrant based on probable cause. Public policy supports this test because an
individual's privacy should be respected.20 Furthermore, this test is inherently
based in reasonableness, which is one of the main requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. 21 Finally, the test serves to reinforce the warrant preference
inherent in the Fourth Amendment.
22
It is important to recognize some limitations on the scope of this Note
before embarking on the substantive analysis. This Note focuses exclusively on
the third-party-consent-versus-primary-party-refusal issue as it relates to
searches of the home-it does not deal with searches of any other private
property, such as automobiles, or commercial property, such as businesses.
Consideration of a search based on a minor's consent to search his parent's
house is also beyond the scope of the Note.23 Finally, although third party
consent searches are inextricably intertwined with the Fourth Amendment,
attempting to explain how the Reasonableness Clause and Warrant Clause of
the Fourth Amendment are related could fill several shelves in a library.24
Instead, this Note will limit its examination to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment over the past two hundred years.
25
ff. Fourth Amendment Background
Searches and seizures of an individual's property are governed by the two
major clauses of the Fourth Amendment: the Reasonableness Clause and the
Warrant Clause.26 The Supreme Court has never satisfactorily explained how
20. See infra Part VI.B (arguing for the reasonable attempt test based on public policy).
21. See infra Part VI.B (arguing for the reasonable attempt test based on the
Reasonableness Clause).
22. See infra Part VI.B (arguing for the reasonable attempt test based on the Warrant
Clause).
23. For a discussion of this issue, see generally Matt McCaughey, Anda Child Shall Lead
Them: The Validity of Children's Consent to Warrantless Searches of the Family Home, 34 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 747 (1995).
24. For an insightful discussion of the Framers' original intent and the ramifications for
modem Fourth Amendment interpretation, see Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547 (1999).
25. See infra Part I.A (considering the Supreme Court's treatment of the relationship
between the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment).
26. "The right of the people to be secure... against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.. . ." U.S. CONST.
amend IV.
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the warrant requirement and the Reasonableness Clause are related.27
Making the situation even more complicated, the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has evolved over time, moving from a strong
preference for Warrants to a more relaxed view that focuses on the
reasonableness of the search and includes numerous exceptions to the
Warrant Clause.28 This Part begins with a brief overview of the Supreme
Court's treatment of the Fourth Amendment. It then focuses on the Fourth
Amendment background of consent searches, beginning with the Court's
rules for searches under the Fourth Amendment, before moving on to the
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning consent searches and the
permissible scope of consent searches.29
A. Reasonableness Is King
The Fourth Amendment promises that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause. 30  Note the immediate tension between the two
clauses: does the Reasonableness Clause control the Warrant Clause or
vice-versa? Unfortunately, the text of the Fourth Amendment "does not
indicate how [the two clauses] fit together., 31  The Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment has not made matters any clearer.
In fact, the Supreme Court has added to the confusion by voicing a
preference for warrants and-in virtually the same breath-creating
numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement.
32
27. See generqlly Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the
Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MIiN. L. REv. 383, 383-84 (1988) (explaining that Fourth
Amendment analysis will continue to be complex and riddled with exceptions until the Supreme
Court suitably defines reasonableness and reconciles the Reasonableness Clause with the
Warrant Clause).
28. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MIcH. L. REV.
1468, 1472-75 (1985) (suggesting that the Supreme Court has abandoned its former adherence
to the Warrant Clause in favor of numerous confusing exceptions); see also infra Part II.B
(listing some of the more common exceptions to the warrant requirement).
29. See infra Part II.B-D (focusing on the Fourth Amendment background of consent
searches).
30. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
31. Davies, supra note 24, at 551. As mentioned above, the actual relationship between
the clauses is beyond the scope of this Note. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text
(limiting the scope of the Note).
32. See Bradley, supra note 28, at 1472-75 (detailing "over twenty" exceptions).
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Professor Thomas Davies succinctly summarizes the Court's
relationship with the Fourth Amendment. 33 Until the past few decades, the
"warrant preference" reigned supreme, meaning that "the use of a valid
warrant-or at least compliance with the warrant standard of probable
cause-[was] the salient factor in assessing the reasonableness of a search
or seizure. "34 Reasonableness was subservient to the Warrant Clause.
During the past fifty years, though, the interpretation has flipped: The
Supreme Court now uses reasonableness as an independent test for valid
searches, bypassing the warrant requirement altogether. 35 The Court's new
reasonableness approach devalues the warrant and determines "the
constitutionality of a search or seizure... simply by making a relativistic
assessment of the appropriateness of police conduct in the light of the totality of
the circumstances."3 6 There are currently so many exceptions to the warrant
requirement that reasonableness is now king.37
B. Searches Under the Fourth Amendment
Katz v. United States38 established the basic test for legitimate searches
33. See Davies, supra note 24, at 558-60 (explaining how the Supreme Court has dealt
with the relationship between the two clauses).
34. Id. at 559.
35. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,30-31(1968) (affirming the constitutionality ofa
reasonable warrantless search). The Court went even further in New Jersey v. T.L. ., which
proclaimed that "the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search"; reasonableness is now at the center
of the Fourth Amendment universe. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
36. Davies, supra note 24, at 559. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,66
(1950) ("The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search was reasonable.").
37. See Bradley, supra note 28, at 1472-75 (listing the exceptions). The end of the next
subpart deals with searches and the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
38. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, FBI agents eavesdropped on
phone calls Katz made from a public telephone booth. Id. at 348. The FBI agents placed
electronic surveillance equipment outside the booth to listen in on Katz's side of the
conversation. Id. The trial court, over the objection of the defendant, allowed the government
to introduce the conversations into evidence. Id. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the
defendant's conviction and found no Fourth Amendment violation because the government
agents did not physically enter the telephone booth to record the defendant's conversations. Id.
at 348-49.
The Supreme Court addressed two issues in Katz: 1) whether the government's recording
of the defendant's conversations constituted a search and seizure and, if so, 2) whether that
search and seizure was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 353-54. The Court first rejected the
idea that the Fourth Amendment creates a general constitutional "right to privacy." Id. at 350.
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under the Fourth Amendment. 39  In fact, Justice Harlan's concurrence
provides the standard for determining whether an individual has a right to
privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 40 Harlan's two-prong test asked
(1) whether the individual had "an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy" and, if so, (2) whether society would deem this a reasonable
expectation of privacy.4' If the police invade this limited right to privacy,
then a search has taken place for Fourth Amendment purposes.
42
In general, police officers are required to obtain a warrant before
conducting a search of an individual's property.43 If the officers do not
obtain a warrant before searching a suspect's property, the trial court will
exclude the evidence from the suspect's trial.44 On the other hand, the Supreme
Court has long recognized certain exceptions to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment under exigent circumstances, such as safety, hot pursuit,
and a search incident to arrest. 45 These are all valid searches and seizures under
Although both the defendant and the government based their arguments on whether the
telephone booth was a "constitutionally protected area," the Court declined to analyze the
Fourth Amendment issue in that way. Id. at 351. Instead, the Court began its analysis with the
now famous axiom that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Id. The
government's actions constituted a "search and seizure" because Katz expected that when he
entered the phone booth to make his phone calls, his conversations would be private. Id. at 353.
The Court overruled those portions of its earlier decisions that had made constitutionality hinge
upon a physical intrusion by the state; therefore, the fact that the electronic surveillance
equipment was not physically inside the booth had "no constitutional significance." Id.
After the Court decided that the government carried out a search, it addressed whether that
search was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 354. The Court decided that while the
government would have been able to obtain a warrant, its failure to obtain a warrant was fatal to
the search and the conversations should not have been allowed into evidence. Id. at 356-59.
Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals. Id. at 359.
39. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining the rule).
40. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 353 (ruling that the government's intrusion into Katz's conversation constituted
a search).
43. See id. at 357 ("[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.").
44. This is the exclusionary rule, which states that evidence obtained in violation of a
suspect's constitutional rights cannot be used against him at trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
648 (1961). The exclusionary rule applies equally to the states. See id. at 657, 660 (holding
that "the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"
and that it is enforceable against the states).
45. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (authorizing the police to
search both a suspect and the area within the suspect's "immediate control" when they arrest the
suspect); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment does not
require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely
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the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that the officers did not possess a
warrant at the time of the search.46 Consent searches, in which a party
affirmatively permits an officer to search her property, are another valid
exception to the warrant requirement.47 Because consent searches are part and
parcel of Fourth Amendment searches and seizures, Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the third-party-consent-versus-primary-party-refusal issue is
critical to resolving the current split among the courts.48 The next subpart
examines the requirements for a valid consent search.49
C. Consent Searches Under the Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court considered the requirements for a valid consent search
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.50 The issue before the Court was the
prosecution's burden to prove that the defendant voluntarily consented to the
search.51 The lower courts used two disparate tests for determining this issue. 2
The California Supreme Court's rule required a court to take into account all
the surrounding factors to judge voluntariness: a totality of the circumstances
endanger their lives or the lives of others.").
46. See cases cited supra note 45 (holding the respective searches constitutional).
47. See United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684,687 (6th Cir. 1977) ("It is well settled that
a search conducted pursuant to a voluntarily obtained consent comes within an exception to the
general warrant requirement of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.").
48. See infra Part II.C (explaining consent searches under the Fourth Amendment by
examining relevant Supreme Court cases).
49. See infra Part II.C (demarcating the requirements for a valid consent search under the
Fourth Amendment).
50. See. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (holding that the
validity of an individual's consent is to be determined by a totality of the circumstances test). In
Bustamonte, police officers pulled over a car in which defendant Bustamonte was a passenger.
Id. at 220. Another passenger, whose brother owned the car, permitted the police to search the
car. Id. Police officers found some stolen checks, which were used as evidence against
Bustamonte at trial. Id. Defendant moved to suppress the checks at trial, but his motion was
denied by the trial court; the California Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of California
both upheld the trial court's ruling, finding that the consent was constitutionally valid. Id. at
220-21. Defendant's writ of habeas corpus was denied by the federal district court, but the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took the appeal. Id. at 221. The Ninth Circuit reversed
the California Supreme Court, ruling that consent was valid only if "given with an
understanding that it could be freely and effectively withheld." Id. at 222. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide what the prosecution must prove to show that consent was
voluntary. Id. at 223. The Court overruled the Ninth Circuit and used the totality of the
circumstances test to evaluate Bustamonte's consent. Id. at 227.
51. Id. at 223.
52. See id. at 223 (explaining that state and federal views on the subject were conflicting).
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test focusing on coercion. 53 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the California Supreme Court, ruling that a party can give voluntary
consent only when she knows that she is allowed to refuse consent.54 The
United States Supreme Court considered whether a lack of coercion equaled
voluntary consent or whether true voluntariness required a waiver.5
The Supreme Court analyzed the meaning of"voluntariness" in criminal
confession cases and determined that although the definition of voluntariness
was too elusive to pin down, each case involving a determination of
voluntariness "reflected a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding
circumstances. 5 6 The touchstone of voluntariness was whether the consent
was coerced." Therefore the Supreme Court, like the California Supreme
Court before it, applied the totality of the circumstances test to Fourth
Amendment consent searches to determine whether the subject of the search
consented of his own free will and not under duress or coercion.58
In Bustamonte, the Supreme Court rejected the "waiver" notion of
consent searches promulgated by the Ninth Circuit.59 The Court considered,
by analogy, that it would be "inconceivable that the Constitution could
countenance the waiver of a defendant's right to counsel by a third party."
6
Furthermore, a waiver theory of consent searches would be utterly
inconsistent with third party consent searches. 6' The waiver theory cannot be
applied to consent searches in general because it is not applicable to third
party consent searches in particular.
62
53. See id. at 221, 223 (describing the standard established by the California Supreme
Court).
54. See id. at 221-22 (explaining the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the prosecution must
demonstrate that any consent was "given with an understanding that it could be freely and
effectively withheld").
55. See id. at 223 (describing the issue).
56. Id. at 226.
57. See id. at 233-34 (analyzing prior Supreme Court decisions that turned on coercion).
58. Id. at 227. The Court rejected the notion that the police officer would need to advise
the subject of the search of the subject's right to refuse. Id. at 231-32.
59. See id. at 246-48 (disposing of the argument that knowledge of a right to refuse was
an indispensable element of a valid consent).
60. Id. at 246.
61. See id. at 245-46 (declaring that a waiver approach does not comport with prior
decisions).
62. See id. at 246 n.34 ("[T]he constitutional validity of third-party consents demonstrates
the fundamentally different nature of a consent search from the waiver of a trial right.").
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D. Scope of Consent Searches
The Supreme Court thoroughly examined the scope of consent searches
in Florida v. Jimeno.63 In Jimeno, the defendant gave a police officer
permission to search his car for narcotics, which the officer found inside a
paper bag on the floor.64 Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing
that he never gave specific consent to search any closed containers in his
vehicle.65 Although the trial court granted his motion, and both the Florida
Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed,66 the United
States Supreme Court granted review "to determine whether consent to
search a vehicle may extend to closed containers found inside the vehicle.,
67
In reversing the lower courts' rulings, the Court noted that "the scope of
a suspect's consent ... is . . . 'objective' reasonableness." 68 In this instance,
the Court determined that it was reasonable for the officer to conclude that
the suspect's consent to search for narcotics extended to a search of closed
containers because they could easily contain narcotics. 69 The Court's
rationale was that "[t]he scope of a search is generally defined by its
expressed object. 70 Thus, while a person may affirmatively limit the scope of
a consent search, the nature of the object for which the officer is searching
intrinsically defines the scope of the search.7'
63. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,249 (1991) (ruling that the Fourth Amendment
allows an officer to open a closed container in an automobile when the officer reasonably
believed that "the suspect's consent permitted [the officer] to open" that container).
64. Id. at 249-50.
65. Id. at 250.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 251 (explaining that the standard is based upon what a reasonable person would
have thought of the interaction "between the officer and the suspect").
69. See id. (illustrating the reasonableness of the officer's conclusion). Because a suspect
is already able to limit the scope of a search to which she consents, the Supreme Court
concluded that the failure to receive specific consent to search the closed container was not
dispositive and reversed the decision of the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 252.
70. Id. at 251. Although this case involved the search of an automobile, the opinion is
relevant to consent searches generally for the proposition that a person who consents to a search
may limit its scope. See id. at 251-52 (declaring that "[a] suspect may of course delimit.., the
scope of the search to which he consents").
71. See id. at 251 (explaining that the consent to search for narcotics included containers
that could reasonably be thought to contain narcotics).
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IlI. Third Party Consent Searches at the Supreme Court Level
Third party consent searches are a unique subset of consent searches. The
Supreme Court allows a third party to consent to a search of an area-or an
item-over which she has authority.72 This Part deals with the legitimacy of
third party consent searches, the requirements for valid third party consent
searches, and the justifications for these searches.
A. United States v. Matlock
The most important Supreme Court case on the question of primary party
refusal in third party consent searches is United States v. Matlock.73 The
question before the Court in Matlock was whether the third party's consent for
the police to search the defendant's house was "legally sufficient" to render the
evidence admissible at trial.74 Police officers arrested the defendant in his front
yard, but did not request his permission to search the house.75 Instead, some of
the police officers approached the house and requested permission to search
from Mrs. Graff, who lived in the house with defendant. 76  Mrs. Graff
consented to the search and the officers found nearly $5,000 in cash in a
closet.77 Both the district court and the court of appeals excluded the evidence
from the trial, finding that Mrs. Graff did not have the authority to consent to
the search.7 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle this evidentiary
issue.79
Justice White, for the Court, espoused the "generally... applied" rule that
"voluntary consent of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises
jointly occupied is valid against the co-occupant. 0 0 The Matlock Court stated,
in its now-famous line, that "the consent of one who possesses common
72. See infra Part III.D (discussing the rationales behind third party consent searches).
73. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). Whether Matlock actually addresses
the situation when a primary party is present is disputed. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing how
much bearing defendant Matlock's presence or absence actually had on the Supreme Court's
decision).
74. Id. at 166.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 166-67. Also living in the house with defendant and Mrs. Graff were Mrs.
Graff's three year old son, her mother, and several of her siblings. Id. at 166.
77. Id. at 166-67.
78. See id. at 167-69 (discussing the conclusions of both courts).
79. Id. at 166.
80. Id. at 169-70.
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authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent,
nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared." 81 After making
this statement, widely considered to be the holding of Matlock, the Court
analyzed Mrs. Graff's relationship to the defendant to determine whether she
had authority to consent to a search.82 The Supreme Court ruled that she had
authority to consent to the search.83
The real issue in Matlock was whether Mrs. Graff had the requisite
authority to permit a search. 84 Oddly enough, lower courts consistently cite it
as the controlling authority in those cases where a present primary party
refuses to consent to the search,85 even though the Court only mentions the
third party consent issue briefly. 86 Nevertheless, Matlock remains the key
Supreme Court decision on this issue precisely because the defendant was
absent when the police obtained Mrs. Graff's consent to search.87 Whether
the primary party's absence was a deciding factor for the Court is discussed
below in Part V.B.2.88 The Matlock Court's rationale behind allowing this
third party consent search is also discussed below.89
81. Id. at 170.
82. See id. at 171-78 (contemplating the extent of Mrs. Graft's authority to consent). In
fact, most of Matlock concerns whether Mrs. Graff had authority to consent to the search, not
whether Matlock's presence or absence had any bearing on the validity of Mrs. Graff's consent.
Id.
83. See id. at 177 (concluding that Mrs. Graft's consent was legally sufficient). The Court
did not decide whether apparent authority would have been sufficient, but instead analyzed the
consent in terms of actual authority. Id. at 177 n. 14.
84. See id. at 167 (explaining that "[t]he issue came to be whether Mrs. Graft's
relationship to [the location searched] was sufficient to make her consent to the search valid
against" the defendant).
85. See infra Part V.A.2 (discussing those lower court decisions that have held that the
primary party's refusal trumps the third party's consent).
86. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-70 (1974) (providing a limited
summation of the rules on third party consent searches).
87. See id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the defendant's absence at the
time the police obtained consent to search).
88. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the importance of the primary party's location at the
time of the search).
89. See infra Part III.D (discussing the rationale behind the Supreme Court's third party
consent search decisions).
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B. Apparent Authority in Third Party Consent Searches
Illinois v. Rodriguez" is the leading Supreme Court case on apparent
authority: Rodriguez established that if the police reasonably believed that a
third party had the authority to consent to a search, the consent will stand
despite the fact that the third party did not have actual authority to permit the
search. 91 In Rodriguez, Gail Fischer told police officers that the defendant
had assaulted her and she led the officers to his apartment so that they could
arrest him.92 Fischer referred to defendant's apartment as "our" apartment,
and told the officers that she kept some of her personal items there.9 3 Using
her key, Fischer opened the apartment for the police, who entered and
arrested the defendant.94 The officers discovered cocaine in the living room,
which they seized. 95 Defendant moved to suppress the evidence based on the
fact that Fischer had no authority to allow the police into his apartment.96
The Illinois trial court granted his motion to suppress, and the appellate court
affirmed.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Illinois appellate court that Fischer
did not have actual authority over the apartment at the time of the search.98
Nevertheless, the Court granted certiorari to determine whether a third party's
consent to a search is valid when the police "reasonably believe [that the third
party]... possess[es] common authority over the premises," even if the third
party has no actual authority at all.99 The Court's analysis hinged upon the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, which does not
demand that police officers' decisions "always be correct, but demands that
they always be reasonable."'100 The Court decided that the issue was not
90. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
91. See id. at 188-89 (declaring that the dispositive question is whether the officer
reasonably believed that the consenting party had authority to consent to a search).
92. Id. at 179.
93. See id. (recounting Fischer's declaration that she kept "clothes and furniture" in the
apartment).
94. Id. at 180.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. (explaining the trial court's conclusion that exclusion was appropriate because
Fischer "did not have common authority over the apartment" at the time when she allowed the
police into defendant's apartment).
98. Id. at 182.
99. ld. at 179.
100. Id. at 185-86.
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whether defendant had waived his right to be free from searches,'01 but
"whether the right to be free of unreasonable searches [had] been
violated."'0 2 The touchstone here, as in other Fourth Amendment cases, was
whether the police officers acted reasonably based on all the information they
had at the time.
10 3
C. Summary of Third Party Consent Searches
The few Supreme Court cases that deal with third party consent searches
offer valuable lessons. In Stoner v. California,104 the Court established the
rule that a hotel clerk does not have the authority to consent to a search of a
101. A waiver standard would clearly fail under Bustamonte. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,246-48 (1973); see also supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text
(discussing Bustamonte).
102. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 187.
103. See id. at 188 (explaining the objective determination of whether consent was
sufficient). The Court did not decide whether the police officers could have reasonably believed
that Fischer had authority over the apartment, but remanded for a decision on that question. Id.
at 189. For a discussion of the rationale used to justify the third party search in Rodriguez, see
infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
104. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). In Stoner, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the police unlawfully obtained evidence admitted against the
defendant at trial. Id. at 484. The police suspected that the defendant had robbed a grocery
store and they tracked him to a room at the Mayfair Hotel. Id. Upon their arrival at the hotel,
the police officers questioned the hotel clerk about the defendant. Id. at 485. The clerk
admitted that he recognized the defendant and explained to the officers that the defendant was
not in his room at that time. Id. The police officers asked the clerk if he would allow them into
the room, explaining that the defendant was a robbery suspect who might have a weapon. Id.
The clerk gave them permission to enter the room, took the officers to the room, and unlocked
the door. Id. The police officers found and seized a pair of glasses, a gray jacket, and a gun-
the evidence at issue on appeal. Id. at 485-86.
The question before the Court was whether the hotel clerk's consent validated the search.
Id. at 487-88. The Supreme Court ruled that the clerk's consent did not render this a valid
search because the clerk had no authority to allow the police to enter the room. Id. at 488-89.
Specifically, "a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures," and a hotel clerk is not the sort of third party who has the authority to
consent to such a search. Id. at 490. The Court rejected the apparent authority argument that
because the police reasonably believed the hotel clerk had authority, the search is valid, and
noted that "the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded by... unrealistic
doctrines of 'apparent authority."' Id. at 488. Strikingly, the Court went on to say that the
defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches was one "which only the [defendant]
could waive by word or deed." Id. at 489. Of course, the Court later rejected the idea that a
consent search was based on the waiver of one's constitutional rights. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,246-48 (1973) (analogizing the waiver of the constitutional right to
be free from searches to the waiver of a trial right). For a discussion of Bustamonte, see supra
notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
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guest's room, thus limiting which third parties have the authority to consent
to a search.10 5 Next, Frazier v. Cupp'0 6 decided that if a third party has
access to one compartment of a duffel bag, he holds the authority to consent to
a search of the entire bag.' 0 7 As discussed above,'0 8 the main Supreme Court
case in this area is Matlock, which clearly established the right of a third party
to consent to a search of any "premises or effects" shared in common. 09
Finally, Illinois v. Rodriguez addressed the validity of a search when the third
party consenting to the search did not actually have common authority over the
area or items searched." 0 In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court ruled that the
validity of a third party's consent depended upon whether the police reasonably
thought that the third party had authority over the area or items to be
searched." '1
105. See Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490 (ruling that "a guest in a hotel room is entitled to
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures").
106. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). Defendant Frazier was convicted of second
degree murder. Id. at 732. Defendant and his cousin (Rawls) were jointly indicted. Id. at 733.
While the police were arresting Rawls, he consented to a search of a duffel bag in his
possession-a duffel bag that belonged to the defendant. Id. at 740. On appeal, the defendant
raised three issues: the misconduct of the prosecutor, the admissibility of his confession, and
the consent given by a third party to allow the police to search his duffel bag. Id. at 733, 737,
740. The Court dismissed the allegation ofprosecutorial misconduct because the judge gave the
jury a limiting instruction that was sufficient to diffuse any harm to defendant. Id. at 735.
Likewise, the Court ruled that the defendant's confession was properly admitted into evidence.
Id. at 738-39.
However, the important issue for the purposes of this Note is whether the items taken
during the search of the duffel bag the defendant shared with his cousin were properly admitted
into evidence. Id. at 740. Rawls consented to a search of the duffel bag. Id. The Court
acknowledged, and the defendant agreed, that Rawls "clearly had authority to consent to its
search." Id. Nevertheless, defendant argued that because he had allowed his cousin to use only
one compartment of the bag, his cousin should have been permitted to consent only to a search
of that compartment and not the entire bag. Id. The Court rejected the defendant's argument as
a "metaphysical subtlet[y]" and stated that the defendant "assumed the risk" when he let his
cousin have access to the duffel bag. Id.
107. See id. at 740 (stating that the defendant's cousin had authority to consent to a search
of the bag). This demonstrates how far the primary party can limit the third party's control over
shared personal property. By analogy, it demonstrates a co-occupant's relationship with areas in
a house or apartment-a primary party may put entire rooms or closets off limits, but probably
not a certain part of a shared room (for example, the primary party could not allow a third party
access to the living room, but forbid the third party to look under the couch cushions).
108. See supra Part III.A (discussing Matlock and its ramifications for cases where the
primary party refuses to consent to a search but the third party consents).
109. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).
110. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181-89 (1990) (considering the challenged search
in light of the "obviously correct" conclusion that the individual giving consent lacked the
authority to do so).
111. Id. at 188-89.
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Despite this roster of Supreme Court cases, there are no cases directly on
point for the third-party-consent-versus-primary-party-refusal issue.'
2
Therefore, the most important consideration from the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence is its rationale in the various cases: from searches, to consent
searches more specifically, to third party consent searches most specifically.
The following subpart focuses on the Supreme Court's rationale behind third
party consent searches.
D. Rationales Behind Third Party Consent Searches
The two main reasons offered for allowing third party consent searches are
(1) common authority and (2) assumption of the risk.1 13 To understand each of
these theories, imagine that Ryan and Steve are roommates who share a
common living room and that the police ask Steve to allow a search for Ryan's
narcotics. Common authority means that when each co-occupant has
independent authority over shared areas, any one co-occupant individually has
the authority to permit a search: Steve may permit the police to search the
shared living room because he has independent authority to allow the search."14
Assumption of the risk, a doctrine based in tort law, means that when two or
more co-occupants share a space in common, each one accepts the possibility
that another may permit a search: Ryan may not stop Steve from allowing the
police to conduct their search because Ryan accepted this risk when he agreed
to share his living space." 15
Nailing down the Supreme Court's rationale behind third party consent
searches is critical because the entire discussion of third-party-consent-versus-
primary-party-refusal may hinge upon the answer to the rationale question. The
112. See cases cited supra notes 104-11 (discussing the Supreme Court jurisprudence on
third party consent searches and the corresponding lack of any Supreme Court case addressing
the third-party-consent-versus-primary-party-refusal issue).
113. See Sharon E. Abrams, Third-Party Consent Searches, the Supreme Court, and the
Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRim. L. & CRImINoLoGY 963, 966-76 (1984) (discussing these
rationales in light of Matlock). The waiver theory of consent searches is no longer valid since
Bustamonte, in which the Court stated that a waiver theory would be inconsistent with third
party consent searches. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 245-46 (1973).
114. See, e.g., Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that a
primary party's presence or absence has absolutely no bearing if a third party with common
authority over a premises consents to a police search).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684,688 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding that if
two parties share a premises, each "assumes the risk of his co-occupant exposing their common
private areas to such a search"). However, as usually happens in these cases, the court also
speaks of common authority as a basis for the third party's valid consent. Id.
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overarching problem for third party consent search analysis is that the Supreme
Court has never precisely defined which rationale it relies on for third party
consent searches.' 16 Both Matlock and Frazier discussed third party consent
searches in terms of common authority, but then, in practically the next
sentence, they switched to the assumption of the risk theory.'
17
The answer, however, may be much simpler than it seems. These
seemingly disparate theories are actually closely intertwined: The key is that
the third party has common authority. The answer to the question, "why has
one joint occupant assumed the risk that another joint occupant might consent
to a search?" is "because each joint occupant has common authority to consent
to a search." The third party has common authority over the premises or
effects; therefore, the primary party has assumed the risk. The primary party
takes upon himself a risk that the third party might consent, but how could there
be a risk unless the third party has some independent authority to consent? In
other words, assumption of the risk is part and parcel of the rationale that the
third party can consent because she has common authority over the searched
item or area.
Unfortunately, there is a snag in this conflation of the common authority
and assumption of the risk theories: Illinois v. Rodriguez. The Supreme Court
in Rodriguez seems to have eliminated the notion that assumption of the risk
can be a valid basis for a third party consent search when it allowed the police
to search a primary party's apartment based solely on the apparent authority of
the third party." 8 Clearly, the primary party did not assume the risk that this
third party might permit a search. Of course, it is also true that the third party
had no common authority over the area searched, but common authority is the
only remaining option:' 19 The search was valid when the police reasonably
116. The Court has been frustratingly unclear as to which theory actually controls its third
party consent search jurisprudence. In fact, the Supreme Court has not even stated its rationale
for consent searches in general, let alone for third party consent searches. Clearly, the Court
does not rely on a waiver rationale to justify third party consent searches. See Bustamonte, 412
U.S. at 245-48 (rejecting the waiver argument). However, both Matlock and Frazier seem to
rely equally on common authority and assumption of the risk, treating them as if they were
interchangeable. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1974) (listing both
common authority and assumption of the risk as rationales for upholding the third party consent
search); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (same).
117. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170-71 (leaving unclear the question of which rationale
carried the day); Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740 (same).
118. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (validating a search based on
the reasonable conclusion that the consenting party had authority).
119. As the great (and fictional) Sherlock Holmes has said, "when you have excluded the
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth." ARTfruR CONAN DOYLE,
THE ADvENTuRES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 268 (Owen Dudley Edwards ed., Oxford University
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believed that the third party had common authority over the area. 20 Rodriguez
cuts the legs out from under the assumption of the risk theory. Since
Rodriguez, common authority is the only legitimate basis for third party consent
searches under the Fourth Amendment. 
121
IV Two Models for Consent Searches
Before considering the circuit split on third party consent searches, it
would be wise to step back for a moment. What is the best way to think about
the situation of two persons who share a common living area? Consider this
hypothetical: Dee Ann and Steph, two young graduates of Ivy League
University, share an apartment in Muncie, Indiana. Although each has her own
private bedroom, they share a living room, kitchen, and bathroom. Late one
night, while Dee Ann is flossing her teeth and getting ready for bed, the
doorbell rings. Who could it be at such a late hour? Why, one of Steph's
friends, Allison, whom Steph has invited over to watch television and have a
few drinks. As Steph attempts to answer the door, Dee Ann quickly steps to
intercept her. A brief argument ensues: Dee Ann has no desire to have a
guest-who may be quite loud-in her living room while she is trying to sleep.
Of course, Steph is equally adamant that she has a right to have a guest visit her
in her living room any time she so desires. In this situation, who has the upper
hand? Does Dee Ann have the right to keep Allison out of the shared living
room, or does Steph have the right to allow Allison into the living room?
The answer to this question-and how one reaches the answer-may shed
some light on various courts' rulings on the third-party-consent-versus-primary-
party-refusal issue. How does one decide who has the authority in this
situation? Is this authority the result of a pre-determined arrangement? How
would two roommates resolve this issue in real life?
From the hypothetical, it appears that there are two ways of thinking about
roommates who have common authority over a given premises: a "veto" model
Press 1998) (1892).
120. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179 (describing the facts that would validate awarrantless
entry). One other possible explanation is the Court did not intend for Rodriguez to eliminate
assumption of the risk as a basis for a third party consent search, but merely to create an
exception to it. However, because assumption of the risk stems from common authority, this
distinction is probably irrelevant. See supra notes 116-19 and accompany text (discussing the
theories behind third party consent searches).
121. For the justification behind this statement, see the discussion on Illinois v. Rodriguez
that appears supra notes 90-103.
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and an "agency" model.1 22 How one thinks about roommate rights will hugely
impact the determination of the third-party-consent-versus-primary-party-
refusal issue. Under the veto model, Dee Ann would have the right to keep
Allison out of the shared living room at such a late hour. 23 Under the agency
model, however, because Steph has common authority over the living room,
she has the absolute right to admit whomever she wants at whatever time she
pleases. These distinctions are thoroughly explored in the following subparts.
A. Veto Model
The veto model, as its name suggests, means that one roommate retains the
right to exclude whomever he wishes from shared areas of a premises. Recall
that in the hypothetical above, Dee Ann did not wish Steph's friend, Allison, to
come in and watch television late in the evening. Under the veto model, Dee
Ann would have the right to keep Allison out of the shared areas of the
apartment.
24
The key factor in this hypothetical is the private citizen-the government's
involvement only raises the stakes. 125 In fact, introducing a government agent
into the mix entirely changes the situation. For example, the Fourth
Amendment protects the citizenry only against "unreasonable searches and
seizures" conducted by the government, not against the exact same searches or
seizures conducted by a private citizen. 26 In the scenario above, if Dee Ann is
in fact a well-known drug dealer who keeps her cocaine hidden behind the
television, she has good reason to want to exclude government agents from
searching the shared areas of her apartment. Whether Steph ignores Dee Ann's
122. I am immensely grateful to Professor Scott Sundby for suggesting these models to me.
123. Of course, Steph would have a similar right to keep Dee Ann's friends out of their
shared areas at her discretion.
124. Steph would still retain the right to let Allison into her room.
125. Whether Dee Ann has the right to exclude Allison or Steph has the right to allow
Allison inside is not, constitutionally speaking, a critical matter; most likely, the roommates will
have worked out an agreement on such issues beforehand. For example, Dee Ann and Steph
might agree that their friends may be in the shared areas of the apartment late at night only on
the weekends.
126. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (explaining that the Fourth
Amendment "proscrib[es] only governmental action," and not a search undertaken by a private
citizen). In fact, the government may introduce at trial information a private citizen obtains from
another citizen, even if it would have been illegal for a government agent to obtain the
information in the exact same way. See id. at 115 ("Whether those invasions were accidental or
deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because of their private character.").
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stated desire for privacy and lets Allison in anyway pales in comparison to
allowing a government agent to come in and conduct a search for Dee
Ann's hidden cocaine.
The real focus for both the veto and the agency models is the
government. Under the veto model, an individual retains his right to
privacy against the government, despite the actions of any other
individual-including an-individual with common authority over a shared
area. The main idea is that one individual cannot surrender to the
government another individual's rights.' . Under the veto model, if a
police officer shows up on the doorstep of the hypothetical apartment and
requests consent to search for Dee Ann's narcotics, Dee Ann is allowed to
veto the search, even if Steph consents.
28
B. Agency Model
The agency model is the opposite of the veto model: under this model,
one roommate has the right to admit anyone she likes, despite the
objections of the other roommate. In the hypothetical above, Steph would
have the right to admit anyone into the shared areas of the apartment at any
time, despite Dee Ann's objections. This agency right to admit any party
into a shared area at any time includes permitting a government agent to
perform a search of the shared areas. Part V.B. 1 inserts the lower courts'
decision into the framework of these models.
V. Current Circuit Split
This Part focuses on the lower court decisions on the third-party-
consent-versus-primary-party-refusal issue since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Matlock. It first considers courts that allow third party consent to
carry the day, and then it examines court decisions that have allowed the
primary party to win. Finally, this examination of the current circuit split
closes with a careful analysis of the courts' rationales behind their disparate
decisions.
127. Of course, if the police came while Dee Ann was away, Steph would have the right to
consent to a search, for the usual third party consent search rules still apply.
128. This veto right works both ways, regardless of whose goods the police seek: even if
Dee Ann wished to allow the police officers to search, Steph has the right to veto the search.
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A. Split Decisions
Courts are split into two camps on the issue of whether primary party
refusal can trump third party consent. Two recent state court cases demonstrate
the opposite conclusions that lower courts have reached in their analysis of
Matlock.129 The next two sections take a closer look at the lower courts'
decisions and the reasons behind the rulings. Note that the cases that allow
third party consent to carry the day tend to follow the agency model more
closely, while courts that allow a primary party's refusal to trump are usually in
accord with the veto model.
130
1. Third Party Consent Trumps Primary Party Refusal
The most recent case allowing a third party's consent to trump a primary
party's refusal is Primus v. State.'3 1 The Court of Appeals of Indiana decided
this interlocutory appeal in August 2004.132 In Primus, police officers stopped
the defendant's roommate, Labroi, and discovered cocaine in her car.' 33 She
told the detective at the scene that the cocaine belonged to Primus and that
there was more in their house. 34 She also gave the detective permission to
search the house for cocaine. 135 The detective and other officers went to
Primus's residence; they located Primus himself down the block from his
house. 36 They ascertained that Labroi and Primus were roommates, but they
129. See Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that a third
party's consent will trump a primary party's refusal). But see Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d
834,837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (requiring police to "honor a present occupant's express objection
to a search of his dwelling"), aft'd, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1840
(2005).
130. Of course, none of the courts use these specific terms. See supra Part V (discussing
the two models for consent searches).
131. See Primus, 813 N.E.2d at 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) ("[O]ne's authority to give
consent is not dependent upon one's location."). Although the defendant was present at the time
of the search in Primus, he did not actually voice his refusal, probably because the officers
conducting the search never asked him for his consent. Id. at 373. Nevertheless, this case
deserves its place in the pantheon of primary-party-refusal-versus-third-party-consent cases
because of the court's analysis of the effect of Primus's location on the validity of the search;
the court concluded that even if Primus had objected to the search, it would have had no bearing
on the outcome of the case. Id. at 376.
132. Id. at 372.
133. Id. at 372-73.
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did not ask Primus for consent before conducting the search, which eventually
yielded a quantity of cocaine. 117
The trial court denied Primus's motion to suppress the cocaine,1 38 and the
appellate court granted an interlocutory appeal to address whether Labroi had
the authority to consent to the search. 139 The court focused on why it was
reasonable both for the officers to believe that Labroi had common authority-
using a totality of the circumstances test-and for them to conduct their
search.1 40 The court did not spend much time dealing with Primus's argument
that "his right to refuse consent, as the party present, should outweigh Labroi's
right to give consent." 14' Although the court included the famous statement
from Matlock that third party consent is valid against an absent, nonconsenting
party who shares common authority, 142 it did not base its decision on Primus's
presence at the scene.143 Instead, the appellate court summarily dismissed the
argument, stating that "one's authority to give consent is not dependent upon
one's location." 144
Primus differs from most primary-party-refusal-versus-third-party-consent
cases because, although Primus was present at the scene, the officers never
asked him for his consent, presuming that the consent already given by the third
party was sufficient. 145 Why then should a discussion of cases in which the
primary party voices his refusal include Primus? The court's rationale was that
a third party with common authority may consent to a search, the primary
party's location, activities, or statements notwithstanding.146 The court's
analysis at the end of Primus made it clear that Primus's whereabouts had no
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 372-73 (expressing the issue presented on appeal).
140. See id. at 373-76 (discussing searches generally and common authority in particular).
141. Id. at 376.
142. See id. at 376 (explaining the validity of consent against an absent party); United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974) ("[Tlhe consent of one who possesses common
authority over premises... is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that
authority is shared.").
143. See Primus, 813 N.E.2d at 376 (calling physical location "irrelevant").
144. Id. at 376. The court did allow that a party's location could have some bearing on a
police officer's reasonable determination that the third party possessed apparent authority. Id.
However, that analysis has no weight when the third party has actual authority.
145. See id. at 373 (detailing the-failure to request consent from Primus).
146. See id. at 376 ("Either a party has authority to consent to a search.., or he or she
does not.").
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bearing on the validity of the search: Even if Primus had objected to the
search, the outcome would have been the same. 1
47
Primus is the most recent in a long line of cases allowing third party
consent to trump primary party refusal. 48 An older, important lower court
case is United States v. Sumlin.149 After the defendant robbed a bank and
was arrested, the police obtained permission, from the defendant's
roommate to search their apartment.150 Defendant Sumlin claimed that
police first asked him for permission to search and he refused; while the
trial court made no finding on this issue, the appellate court assumed that
the defendant's version was correct for purposes of their analysis.15'
Although the defendant argued that his initial refusal distinguished his
situation from that of the defendant in Matlock, his argument did not
impress the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 52 The court reasoned from
Matlock that the third party's authority to permit a search did not depend
upon the defendant's presence or absence, or upon his consent or refusal.
153
Instead, the Sumlin court stated that a third party consent search is
warranted-or not-based on common authority: If two parties share a
premises, each "assumes the risk of his co-occupant exposing their common
private areas to such a search.' ' 5 4 Therefore, the primary party's refusal is
immaterial; each party has independent authority to consent to a search of
the shared areas of her property.
55
Like its Supreme Court precursors, Sumlin employed common
authority and assumption of the risk interchangeably.' 56 Primus did the
147. See id. at 376 (making it plain that any party who has common authority over a
premises or item has the requisite authority to consent, even if another party with common
authority objects).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883,885 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that
the search of defendant's apartment was legitimate based on a third party's consent despite the
defendant's objection to the search).
149. See United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that
refusal by a primary party is constitutionally insignificant where a third party with common
authority consents to a search).
150. Id. at 685-86.
151. Id.at686,687n.8.
152. See id. at 687-88 (declaring that the additional fact had no constitutional
significance).
153. See id. (explaining the significance of the Matlock holding).
154. Id. at 688.
155. See id. at 687-88 (concluding that consent of a co-occupant is effective
notwithstanding any prior refusal by the other co-occupant).
156. See id. at 688 (stating that assumption of the risk is the rationale behind the common
authority doctrine).
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same.'57 Both cases demonstrate that one co-occupant's common authority
carries the day: when one co-occupant has independent authority over an area,
no other co-occupant can veto the search. 5 8 Thus, Primus and Sumlin
exemplify the agency model of consent searches. 5 9
2. Primary Party Refusal Trumps Third Party Consent
On the opposite side of the coin is Randolph v. State,160 which recently
decided that refusal by the primary party trumps consent given by a third
party.161 Defendant Randolph's wife told police officers that her husband had
cocaine in the house. 162 When an officer asked Randolph for his consent to
search the house, he flatly refused. 163 The officer then promptly turned and
asked the defendant's wife, who consented to the search. 64 The officer
collected a "piece of cut straw" that had cocaine residue on it; with this piece of
evidence, he was able to obtain a search warrant that led to the discovery of
"numerous drug-related items."'165 The trial court quashed the defendant's
motion to suppress the drug evidence. 166 This case, like Primus, was an
interlocutory appeal taken up by the state appellate court to decide the
evidentiary issue.'
67
The issue in Randolph was "whether it is reasonable for one occupant to
believe that his stated desire for privacy will be honored, even if there is
another occupant who could consent to a search."' 168 Clearly, the defendant
157. See Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (basing assumption of
the risk upon the third party's common authority over the shared premises).
158. See United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1977) ("It is equally well
settled that a third person... can consent to a search of a defendant's premises or effects if that
third person has common authority over the premises or effects."); Primus, 813 N.E.2d at 376
(declaring that a third party's common authority is sufficient to permit the search, regardless of
primary party's words or actions).
159. See supra Part IV.B (explaining the agency model of consent searches).
160. Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003), af'd, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga.
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1840 (2005).
161. See id. at 837 (requiring police to "honor a present occupant's express objection to a
search of his dwelling").





167. See id. (describing the procedural history of the case).
168. Id.
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wished his privacy to be honored, despite his wife's consent to the search. 169
The court first considered whether there was any controlling precedent on this
question, beginning with Matlock's statement about the consent of an "absent
nonconsenting" party, but rejected it as nonprecedential because here the
defendant was certainly present-and even objecting-when the search
occurred.1 70  Nevertheless, the court briefly distinguished Randolph from
Matlock, explaining that the latter case "stand[s] for the proposition that, in
absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that a co-occupant
has waived his right of privacy as to other co-occupants.' 7'1 The defendant in
Randolph clearly rebutted that presumption by voicing his objection to the
search. 172
The Randolph court's theory was that common authority works both ways:
Just as one co-occupant may exercise consent rights for all, so another co-
occupant may exercise privacy rights for all.173 In a non-third-party-consent
search, the subject of the search is allowed to set limits and even withdraw
consent at any time. 17 4 Therefore, when there are two or more co-occupants,
the court found it "inherently reasonable" that when one co-occupant grants
consent, another co-occupant may exercise his right to terminate the search.175
The court also advanced a public policy rationale for its holding, explaining
that police officers need a bright-line rule for when they may conduct a
search. 176 If an officer's request for consent is refused, the officer should be
required to obtain a search warrant based on probable cause. 177 For all the
foregoing reasons, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court
and excluded the evidence.
178
169. See id. (recounting the defendant's unequivocal rejection of a request to search).
170. See id. at 836-37 (explaining that Matlock does not discuss the precise issue
presented).
171. Id. at 837-38 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 838. In such a situation, the-issue becomes "whether [Mrs. Randolph] may
waive her husband's right to be free from the search," not whether she had the "right to consent
to a search." Id. The same reasoning applies to an assumption of the risk analysis: "[T]he risk
assumed by a co-occupant is that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the other co-
occupant might grant consent to search." Id. (emphasis added).
173. See id. at 837 ("Inherent in the power to grant consent is the power to vitiate that
consent.").
174. Id. at 837; see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,252 (1991) ("A suspect may of
course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents.").
175. Randolph, 590 S.E.2d. at 837.
176. See id. (explaining the need for the court to provide clear guidance to law enforcement
personnel).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 840. The Georgia Supreme Court subsequently affirmed this appellate court
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The Randolph decision was merely the most recent among the cases that
have allowed a primary party's refusal to trump a third party's consent. 179 An
earlier case supporting this position is Silva v. Florida.80 In Silva, the
defendant and the third party, Mrs. Brandon, had been living together and
holding themselves out as husband and wife.' 8' After the defendant hit Mrs.
Brandon in the mouth one day, she walked to a convenience store and called
the police, telling them that the defendant was a felon and had guns in his
closet. 182 When police arrived at the house, Mrs. Brandon let them in and told
them that "the guns were in the hall closet."1 83 Defendant, who was also
present, strenuously objected to the search of the closet. ' 4  Over the
defendant's objection-but with Mrs. Brandon's consent-the police
conducted the warrantless search, found the guns, and arrested the defendant. 185
The Florida Supreme Court addressed "the validity of a warrantless search
when two parties having joint dominion and control are present, and one
consents but the other objects."'186 The Silva court's main focus, in considering
decision. State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1840
(2005).
179. See Randolph, 604 S.E.2d at 836 (affirming the appellate court decision).
180. Silva v. Florida, 344 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1977). Interestingly, this case was decided the
same year as Sumlin, which reached the opposite result. See United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d
684, 688 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that refusal by a primary party is constitutionally insignificant
where a third party with common authority consents to a search). For a discussion of Sumlin,
see supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.






186. Id. at 562. Before reaching this issue, the court first considered how and whether the
lack of a marital relationship would have any bearing on the issue. Id. at 560-62. Under
Florida law in force at the time of this case, nonmarried individuals could waive one another's
constitutional rights (i.e., by consenting to a search), but a married individual did not have a
similar ability with respect to the rights of his or her spouse. Id. at 561. The theory behind this
law was that "the husband and wife relationship was of such a nature as to prevent either spouse
from acting against the family's interest by consenting to a warrantless search of the other's
property," whereas nonmarried persons were acting as individuals and could act in their own
interest. Id. In this situation, when the primary party is "present and objecting" while the third
party is consenting, the court decided that "the validity of search should not hinge on the marital
status of the parties." Id.
Similarly, in Randolph, the third party and primary party were husband and wife.
Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003), aft'd, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 2004),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1840 (2005). The Georgia Appellate Court did not give much weight
to this factor, however, merely noting in passing that "Georgia courts strive to... avoid
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prior cases, was the defendant's presence at the time of the search: The court
cited Matlock as one of the main Supreme Court cases where the defendant was
absent at the time of the search. 187 The Silva court stressed that the primary
party's absence was the key to upholding a valid third party consent search.1
88
The reasoning behind this decision was that "a present, objecting party should
not have his constitutional rights ignored" simply because he shares his
property with another. 8 9 Therefore, where the primary party is present, the
court determined that he should have "controlling authority" to refuse a consent
search.' 90
Since Primus and Sumlin both fit into the agency model, 191 it should come
as no surprise that Randolph and Silva both embody the veto model. These
latter cases, which allowed a primary party's refusal to trump a third party's
consent, both stressed that an individual does not relinquish any constitutional
rights simply by sharing his premises with another. 192 Both Randolph and Silva
considered common authority and found that the party at whom the search is
directed ought to be able to cast a controlling veto over the consent search. 193
circumstances that create adversity between spouses." Id. In Randolph, the marriage between
the third party and primary party became merely another factor that tipped the scales in favor of
allowing the defendant's refusal to override the third party's consent. Id.
187. Silva, 344 So. 2d at 562.
188. See id. (emphasizing the importance of the absence of the party against whom the
search is directed and declaring that "evidence obtained in a search is inadmissible against a
person having equal rights in the premises if he is present at the time of the search and does not
consent .... ") (citing United States v. Robinson, 479 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1973)).
189. Id. This is especially true when the police know that it is the primary party's
constitutional rights at stake, and not the third party's. Id. at 563. Note, though, that the Silva
court couches part of its discussion in waiver language. See id. at 561 ("[T]he husband and wife
relationship. .- does not authorize one spouse to waive the constitutional rights of the other by
consenting to a warrantless search."). The waiver theory is no longer a valid theory for consent
searches. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1974) (rejecting the notion
that consent to search is a waiver of constitutional rights); supra notes 50-62 and accompanying
text (discussing Bustamonte).
190. Silva, 344 So. 2d at 562. After it decided this issue, the court considered whether
Mrs. Brandon had authority over the closet necessary to authorize a consent search; the court
decided that she did not. Id. at 564. However, this issue is moot in light of the court's sweeping
pronouncement that the defendant's refusal trumped the police officers' right to search despite
Mrs. Brandon's consent. Id. at 562.
191. See supra Part V.A. 1 (analyzing these third party consent cases and how they fit into
the models).
192. See Silva, 344 So. 2d at 562 (noting that one co-occupant does not forfeit her
constitutional rights because she shares her property with another); Randolph v. State, 590
S.E.2d 834,838 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (judging that co-occupants assume the risk that another co-
occupant might permit a search in their absence, but not the risk that another co-occupant may
override their constitutional "right to be free from police intrusion").
193. See Silva, 344 So. 2d at 562 ("[A] present, objecting party should not have his
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Finally, both cases stated that the primary party's absence in Matlock was a
deciding factor in that case. 94
B. Arguments and Rationales
The lower courts that have decided the third-party-consent-versus-primary-
party-refusal issue deal primarily with common authority and assumption of the
risk.' 9' Though all four lower court cases-Primus, Sumlin, Randolph, and
Silva-argued from common authority, they reached opposite results.
96 There
are two main reasons for this disparity: First, and more importantly, the courts
espoused different models for third party consent searches.
197 Second, the
courts relied on two different interpretations of Matlock.19
8
1. Where the Cases Fit into the Models
As mentioned at the beginning of this Part, the courts on both sides of the
issue unconsciously subscribe to either the veto model or the agency model.
Primus, a pro-third-party-consent case, exemplified the agency model when it
constitutional rights ignored because ofa... property interest shared with another."); Randolph,
590 S.E.2d at 838 (deciding that where the primary party is present, the third party may not
waive the primary party's right to refuse the search).
194. See Silva v. Florida, 344 So. 2d 559, 562 (Fla. 1977) (noting that all the Supreme
Court cases on the issue involved the primary party's absence); Randolph, 590 S.E.2d at 836
(explaining that no Supreme Court decisions involve the primary party's presence at the time of
the search).
195. For example, the recent decisions in Primus and Randolph spent a good deal of time
discussing the defendant's assumption of the risk that a co-occupant might permit a search,
though they came to opposite conclusions. See Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004) ("[I]t is reasonable to recognize that any of the cohabitants has the right to permit
the inspection in his or her own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit the common area to be searched."). But see Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d
834, 838 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he risk assumed by a co-occupant is that, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the other co-occupant might grant consent to search.").
196. See Primus, 813 N.E.2d at 376 (finding that a when a third party has common
authority, her consent will always validate a search, a primary party's objection
notwithstanding); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88 (6th Cir. 1977) (same). But
see Silva v. Florida, 344 So. 2d 559, 562 (Fla. 1977) (ruling that a third party cannot waive a
primary party's rights if the primary party is present); Randolph, 590 S.E.2d at 837 (disallowing
a third party's consent to stand where the primary party is present and voicing his objection to
the search), affid, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1840 (2005).
197. See infra Part V.B. 1 (explaining where the cases fit into the veto and agency models).
198. See infra Part V.B.2 (examining the lower courts' analyses of Matlock).
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stated that common authority carries the day, refusal notwithstanding. 199 This
is the essence of the agency model. Likewise, Sumlin based its decision on
the third party's authority, ignoring any dissent from a primary party.2°°
Because they ruled that a third party's consent will always be sufficient to
justify a search, both of these cases accepted-though not in so many
words-an agency model for co-occupants.
On the other side of the issue are those courts for which primary party
refusal reigns supreme. The Randolph court offered a shining example of the
veto model: Randolph explicitly stated that even if one co-occupant gives
consent to a search, another co-occupant has the absolute right to withdraw
this consent. 2° This is the veto model come to life. Silva followed the veto
model to an extent, though the Silva court made the party at whom the search
is directed an all-important factor by giving the primary party controlling
authority to withhold consent-or to override consent already given by a third
party. 2°2 Nevertheless, Silva remains firmly entrenched in the veto model.
The split between the models explains the courts' diametrically opposed
interpretations of common authority. Whereas the agency model-and the
Primus and Sumlin courts-gives the third party the independent authority to
consent to a search, the veto model-demonstrated by the Randolph and
Silva courts-gives the primary party the right to override the third party's
authority.20 3 However, there is another important factor to consider in these
cases: the presence of the primary party.
199. See Primus, 813 N.E.2d at 376 (supporting a search based solely on common control
of the premises).
200. See Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 687-88 (allowing a search based on the consent of a co-
occupant).
201. See Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834,837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that a co-
occupant may exercise his competing right to be free of a search authorized by another co-
occupant), aff'd, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1840 (2005).
202. See Silva v. Florida, 344 So. 2d 559, 562 (Fla. 1977) (giving the primary party the
power to refuse a consent search).
203. The veto model probably also gives a third party the right to veto a search. Contra
Silva, 344 So. 2d at 562 ("It is only reasonable that the person whose property is the object of a
search should have controlling authority to refuse consent."). In other words, it is unclear from
Silva's decision whether a third party's refusal to consent would be controlling if the primary
party consented. Id. at 562-63. Although the court clearly stated that a "present, objecting
party should not have his constitutional rights ignored" simply because he shares an area in
common with another, it affirmed only that this is "particularly true" where the objecting party is
"the one whose constitutional rights are at stake," leaving unclear the situation where a third
party desires to prohibit the search. Id.
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2. How Important Is the Primary Party's Absence?
For lower courts trying the third-party-consent-versus-primary-party-
refusal issue, the heart of Matlock is its language about the validity of a third
party consent search against the "absent, nonconsenting person.",204 The crux of
the issue comes down to whether the primary party actually needs to be absent
for a third party to give valid consent. Courts that allowed third party consent
to trump the primary party's refusal concentrated on the fact that the defendant
was actually present in his front yard, though the police failed to ask his
permission to search, and, instead, received permission from a co-occupant of
the house. 05 Thus, under Matlock, the courts reasoned, it mattered not whether
the defendant was present or absent at the time of the search, and it was




However, Justice Douglas's dissent in Matlock includes some important
details about what actually happened immediately prior to the search.2 07 In that
case, the police officers arrested the defendant, who "was restrained in a squad
car a distance from the home., 20 8 Only after the officers removed the defendant
from his front yard and placed him in the back of the police car did they
approach the house and ask Mrs. Graff for permission to search the
residence.2° In other words, the defendant was actually absent from the scene
when the police officers obtained permission from the third party.210
This fact presents a troubling situation for courts that would require police
officers to obtain consent from a primary party who is present at the scene. It
appears that the police could circumvent the "ask the present primary party"
rule simply by taking the primary party into custody and removing him from the
scene, as they did in Matlock.211 Thus, if Sarah and Laura shared an apartment
and the police desired to search a common room for Sarah's marijuana, her
204. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974)..
205. See, e.g., United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1977) ("Matlock did
not depend on the defendant's absence for the defendant there had just been arrested in the front
yard of the residence when the third person's consent to search was procured.").
206. See, e.g., Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) ("Either a party
has authority to consent to a search ... or he or she does not.").
207. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 178-79 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (detailing the facts of the
case). Justice Douglas's main point is not that the defendant's absence is dispositive on this
issue, but rather that "the crucial finding in the case" is that the police had time to obtain a
warrant, which they should have done. Id. at 180 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
209. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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constitutional rights would depend entirely on serendipity.2 12 If Sarah is home when
the police come to search, she may freely withhold her consent, but if Sarah is out,
Laura's consent will clearly suffice.213
The importance of the primary party's presence or absence hinges upon two
things: the Supreme Court's rationale behind third party consent searches and the
model one accepts in thinking about the authority of co-occupants. If common
authority is the basis for third party consent searches, then the primary party's
location is irrelevant. Even under an assumption of the risk analysis, as soon as
Sarah leaves the shared apartment, she has taken the risk that Laura might betray her
privacy interest to the government. This sort of common authority--or assumption
of the risk-analysis fits perfectly into the scheme of the agency model. The agency
model means that in Sarah's absence, Laura may act as her agent to permit or
exclude govemmental intrusion as she sees fit.
The veto model, on the other hand, gives a twist to the agency interpretation of
common authority.214 Common authority remains the authority of one occupant to
consent; however, another occupant may override this consent by withdrawing
consent to search. The veto model's version of common authority posits that no one
co-occupant may trump the privacy right of another occupant. Nevertheless, the
presence or absence of the primary party will still be dispositive: if the primary
party is absent, the third party may grant consent, which will go uncontested.215
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, only when both the primary party and
the third party are present do the veto and the agency models come into play.
VI. Resolution
This concluding Part begins by recapping the rationale behind third party
consent searches. Instead of ending with a summation of where the law is today, it
212. A rule making Sarah's constitutional rights hinge upon her presence would doubtless
encourage the police to wait for the opportune moment when she has left her shared apartment
or, if the officers had probable cause, they might simply arrest Sarah and then ask Laura for her
consent.
213. The problem, under both the veto and the agency model, is that this is the exact
situation today: The police may simply wait for the primary party to leave, then obtain consent
from the third party. This is one reason for the reasonable attempt test proposed in Part VI.B
infra.
214. However, assumption of the risk remains untouched-the veto model dictates
situations where two or more parties are present, not where one occupant consents in the
absence of any or all other affected parties. Consider that since Illinois v. Rodriguez, common
authority may be the only real basis for third party consent searches. See supra notes 118-21
and accompanying text (discussing Rodriguez's effect on the basis for consent searches).
215. See supra notes 213-14 (introducing the "serendipity problem").
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argues for a change: the reasonable attempt test. This test requires the police
officers to take reasonable steps to obtain consent from the party at whom the
search is directed. If the police do not take reasonable steps to obtain the
primary party's consent, or the primary party refuses to consent, the officers
would be required to obtain a warrant based on probable cause. Under this new
test, refusal by the primary party would trump a third party's consent because
this is the optimal outcome for society: allowing one co-occupant to veto the
consent of another co-occupant upholds the individual's privacy interest.
Moreover, the reasonable attempt test comports with the Reasonableness
Clause in the Fourth Amendment. If the party at whom the search is directed
objects to a consent search, the police will have to obtain a warrant to carry out
their search, which would reinforce the warrant preference inherent in the
Fourth Amendment.
A. The State of the Law Today
Given the current Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area, third party
consent to a search must trump refusal by a primary party. Matlock teaches that
a third party's consent may validate a search made against a co-occupant.
216
Rodriguez goes even further by allowing searches consented to by a third party
who only appeared to possess authority over a primary party's premises.1 7 The
rationales behind these cases are the key to determining the outcome of the
third-party-consent-versus-primary-party-refusal issue. Matlock clearly relies
on the theories of common authority and assumption of the risk to justify third
party consent searches;218 allowing primary party refusal to trump consent given
by a third party does not make sense under either theory.
219
How would Matlock have turned out if the defendant had been present at
the time of the search? Under an assumption of the risk analysis, the Court
probably would have allowed the search because the primary party knew that a
216. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-70 (1974).
217. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (holding that an officer's
reasonable belief that third party has authority validates a search).
218. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170-71 (discussing both common authority and assumption
of the risk); supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text (discussing these rationales). Whether
Rodriguez actually undercuts assumption of the risk or merely creates an exception to it is not
dispositive of the issue, for common authority alone could underpin the Supreme Court's
decisions. See supra note 120 (discussing Rodriguez).
219. Matlock implies that common authority equals independent authority, meaning that
the third party would have been able to consent even if the primary party had been present. See
discussion infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (considering the effect of the primary
party's presence).
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third party might permit the police to search any shared areas. 220 Similarly, if
the Court wanted to base its decision in common authority, it might reason that
the third party's authority precludes any other co-occupant from trumping that
authority: as in Primus, the third party's authority is an independent,
unalterable basis for permitting a search.22' In other words, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of common authority seems to parallel the agency model
for co-occupants, in that one party may consent to a search of any shared area,
refusal by another party notwithstanding.222 If the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to a case with facts such as those in Primus, the third party's consent
would almost certainly be enough to validate a search, even if the primary party
were standing there and objecting.
B. The Reasonable Attempt Test
The Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue precludes a rule that would
223allow a primary party's refusal to trump a third party's consent.  One must
consider, however, as the Randolph and Silva courts did, whether this is the
most desirable result for society. When someone with a clear privacy interest
says "no" to a consent search, the justice system ought not to consider this a
valid search under the Fourth Amendment. In this situation, the person whose
property the police wish to search ought to have controlling authority to consent
to-or to refuse-such a search. This Note proposes a reasonable attempt test
for police officers who wish to do a consent search of another's property.
Under this new test, the police officers must take reasonable steps to obtain
consent from the party at whom the search is directed, whether or not that party
220. This is analogous to the situation in Frazier, where the defendant should have known
that by letting his cousin borrow his duffel bag, he assumed the risk that his cousin might permit
someone to search the duffel bag. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
221. See Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that the
primary party may not overrule the consent of a third party who has authority to consent to a
search).
222. See supra Part IV.B (explaining the agency model for consent searches). As a
sidenote, even if the Court decided that, under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, primary
party refusal ought to carry the day, it could not rely on either an assumption of the risk or a
common authority analysis because this would implicate the waiver right. The idea is that if a
primary party gets to veto a third party, it is because that third party is waiving the primary
party's constitutional rights. However, this rule would fail because the waiver standard of
constitutional rights has no place in third party consent searches under the Bustamonte totality
of the circumstances test. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 245-48 (1973)
(establishing the test and rejecting the waiver argument).
223. See supra Part VI.A (discussing the current state of the law on this issue).
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224is present at the scene. If the police do not take reasonable steps to obtain the
primary party's consent, or the primary party refuses to consent, the officers
would be required to obtain a warrant based on probable cause.225
There are many reasons for implementing such a test. First, a party does not
immediately give up her constitutional rights to the government simply because
she shares a living space with another: this is the essence of the veto model.226
Although the veto model would still allow ordinary third party consent searches to
stand-so long as the police first reasonably attempted to obtain the primary
party's consent-whenever a primary party is present at the scene, her veto has
controlling authority. The veto model is preferable to the agency model precisely
because it upholds an individual's rights against government intrusion.
227
Second, under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, all searches and
seizures must be reasonable.228 This new reasonable attempt test is, as the name
implies, based in reasonableness, for it requires government agents to obtain the
consent of the party against whom the search is directed, if possible. Rodriguez,
the Supreme Court case that allowed police officers to search based on the
apparent authority of a third party, strongly stated that reasonableness is the test
against which searches must stand or fall.229 If reasonableness is the basis for a
third party consent search, surely it is inherently reasonable that the police officers
first make an attempt to locate the primary party before conducting their search
based on the consent of a third party-especially when that third party might not
have actual authority over the premises.
Finally, the Warrant Clause in the Fourth Amendment lends support to the
reasonable attempt test. Although the Supreme Court focuses more on the
Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment these days, the Warrant Clause
is still in force and using a search warrant is the easiest way for the police to
224. As mentioned at the beginning of the Note, if the officers wish to search a shared
apartment for goods when they suspect more than one individual, the officers would have to
attempt to obtain the consent of all the individuals directly implicated in the search. Supra note
19.
225. This Note does not attempt to define what makes an attempt "reasonable."
226. See supra Part IV.A (explaining the veto model). Moreover, the reasonable attempt
test avoids the serendipity problem-that a primary party loses her constitutional rights as soon
as she steps out the door-by requiring police officers to make a reasonable attempt to locate
the primary party before conducting a consent search. See supra notes 213-14 (discussing the
serendipity problem).
227. See supra Part IV.A (explaining the veto model).
228. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,337 (1985) ("[T]he underlying command of
the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable.... ").
229. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990) (requiring police officers'
searches to "always be reasonable").
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ensure that the evidence from their search will be admitted at trial.230 The
reasonable attempt test seeks to reconcile the two clauses of the Fourth
Amendment: first, by acknowledging the Supreme Court's leanings toward
reasonableness, in requiring the police to make a reasonable attempt to locate the
primary party, and second, by the fall back position that the police must acquire a
search warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate.
The reasonable attempt test balances the government's need to obtain
evidence with the individual's right to privacy. So long as the government agents
make a reasonable attempt to obtain permission from the primary party, they may
search based on third party consent. However, when the agents do not make a
reasonable attempt, or when the primary party refuses to consent, they must
obtain a search warrant. This test ensures that an individual does not relinquish
his right of privacy with respect to the government simply because he shares a
premises with another.231
C. Conclusion
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, a third party's consent will
always trump a primary party's refusal.232 However, a number of lower court
230. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (explaining that any evidence will be
kept out of the trial because of the exclusionary rule unless the search falls under one of the
numerous exceptions to the Warrant Clause).
231. But cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) ("The risk of being...
betrayed by an informer.., is probably inherent in the conditions of human society."). In
Hoffa, the defendant confided in a man who was a government agent, though the defendant was
unaware of this fact. Id. at 300, 302. The Court declared that this was not a Fourth Amendment
search, and that the defendant assumed the risk that his confidant might betray him. Id. at 303.
Hoffa is distinguishable from the third-party-consent-versus-primary-party-refusal cases because
of 1) the nature of a search and 2) the different interests involved.
First, Hoffa stated that this betrayal of information by the agent was not a search: There is
no such thing as a verbal search. Id. at 300. A consent search clearly is a Fourth Amendment
search. See supra Part II.C (introducing consent searches and explaining how they fit into the
Fourth Amendment). Second, while government agents can illegally search via eavesdropping,
they commit no such illegal search where they plant an informer with whom the defendant
shares information. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 303; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (ruling that the government's wiretapping of a phone booth constituted an illegal search).
Hoffa involved spoken words, while third party consent searches involve physical property. See
Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 300 (explaining the contention that listening to the petitioner's conversation
was an illegal search for verbal evidence). A party who shares information with a third party
immediately gives up his right of secrecy to that information, whereas a party who shares
property with another does not automatically give up his right of privacy with respect to the
government. Id. at 303.
232. See supra Part VI.A (explaining the state of the law on the third-party-consent-versus-
primary-party-refusal issue).
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cases, emphasizing the individual's privacy right against the government, have
allowed the primary party's refusal to override a third party's consent. 33 Under
Matlock and other Supreme Court progeny, these lower court cases that favor
the primary party must fail. 3 Therefore, this Note suggests a new, reasonable
attempt test: a government agent must make a reasonable attempt to locate the
party at whom the search is directed, else the search must fail.235 This test
would both uphold the individual's privacy right and satisfy the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment.2 36 Simply stated, the Court ought not consider it a
valid Fourth Amendment search when someone with a clear privacy interest
refuses to consent to a warrantless search.
233. See supra Part V.A.2 (giving two examples of lower court cases that found for the
primary party).
234. See supra Part VI.A (detailing why the theories of common authority and assumption
of the risk do not allow this result).
235. See supra Part VI.B (setting out the reasonable attempt test in more detail).
236. See supra Part VI.B (arguing these very reasons for implementing the reasonable
attempt test).

